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Ownership a More Necessary Public Use?
Emily Gutierrez
I. INTRODUCTION
The saga of the City of Missoula’s (City) attempt to gain control
of the privately held water system has concluded for now.1 In City of
Missoula v. Mountain Water,2 the Montana Supreme Court found that the
City’s ownership of the aging, privately held water system constituted a
“more necessary public use.” The majority applied the correct standard of
review and properly affirmed the lower court’s decision in accordance
with precedent and relevant statutes. Mountain Water shed light on the
“more necessary public use” analysis and the specificity of factual findings
required to support the determination.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mountain Water, a Montana corporation, has owned Missoula’s
water system since purchasing it from Montana Power Company in 1979.3
After failed negotiations to purchase Mountain Water, a giardia outbreak
in the Rattlesnake, and mounting frustration with Mountain Water’s
ownership of the water system, the City initiated its first condemnation
proceeding against Mountain Water in 1984.4 A lengthy legal battle
ensued, with two appeals to the Montana Supreme Court, but the City
ultimately did not succeed in condemning Mountain Water.5
The City, after its 2014 offer to purchase the water supply system
for $50 million was rejected, filed a condemnation action in the Fourth
Judicial District Court in Missoula, seeking to exercise its power of
eminent domain.6 The City initiated its condemnation action against
Mountain Water and Carlyle Infrastructure Partners, LP (Carlyle), a global
investment partnership and Mountain Water’s controlling shareholder.7
The employees of Mountain Water (Employees) intervened in the suit.8
The district court issued a 68-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Preliminary Order of Condemnation subsequent to a three1

City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., No. DA 15-0375, ___ P.3d ___, 2016 WL 4124135 (Mont.
Aug. 2, 2016) (Rice, J. dissenting; McKinnon, J., dissenting); see generally City of Missoula v.
Mountain Water Co., 742 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1987) (Sheehy, Holmstrom, JJ., dissenting) (Mountain
Water I); City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., 771 P.2d 103 (Mont. 1989) (Mountain Water II).
2
2016 WL 4124135, at *1.
3
Mountain Water I, 742 P.2d at 592.
4
Id.
5
See Mountain Water I, 742 P.2d at 595; Mountain Water II, 771 P.2d at 110.
6
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *1.
7
Id.
8
Id. at *2.
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week bench trial, finding that Missoula’s ownership of the water system
constituted “a more necessary public use.”9 Defendants appealed the
district court’s order and appropriately filed a claim for just compensation
with the district court.10 The district court appointed commissioners, per
statutory requirement, who determined the fair market value of Mountain
Water at $88.6 million.11 Mountain Water did not appeal the
commissioners’ assessed value of $88.6 million.12 Appellants Mountain
Water, Carlyle, and Employees raised eight issues, including procedural,
due process, and substantive claims; however, the main dispute centered
on whether the City had proven, by a preponderance of evidence, whether
its ownership of the water system constituted a “more necessary public
use.”13
III. MAJORITY HOLDING
Justice Cotter wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
McGrath and Justices Shea, Baker, and Wheat.14 The majority was
unpersuaded by the Mountain Water’s procedural arguments, finding no
reversible error with the district court’s rulings.15 Of the issues presented,
the Court devoted the most time to analyzing the district court’s findings
that led to its conclusion that the City’s acquisition of Mountain Water
constituted “a more necessary public use.”16 The Court systematically
addressed the district court’s findings and determined that the factual
findings were “supported by substantial credible evidence and are not the
product of bias in favor of public ownership.”17
IV. JUSTICE RICE’S DISSENT
Justice Rice’s dissent forcibly argues that Mountain Water was
deprived of due process due to an unconstitutional burden shift, various
discovery abuses, rulings on inadmissibility of evidence, and the district
court’s “judicial preference for condemnation.”18 Justice Rice agreed with
Mountain Water that the district court’s findings aired an implicit bias that

9

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order of Condemnation, City of Missoula v.
Mountain Water Co., https://perma.cc/ZWP3-Y75K (Mont. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2015) (No. DV-14-352).
10
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *7–8.
11
Id. at *3; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–206.
12
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *3.
13
Id. at *1.
14
Id. at *26.
15
Id. at *4, 7, 9, 10 (holding that that the district court did not err in denying defendant’s motions for
a continuance, refusing to dismiss Carlyle, excluding evidence of valuation, or precluding the claim
based on collateral estoppel).
16
See Id. at *19–27.
17
Id. at *27.
18
Id. at *28, 30, 32 (Rice, J., dissenting).
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favored private ownership to municipal ownership.19 This presumption,
Justice Rice stated, resulted in an unconstitutional burden shift and
allowed the City to escape its burden of proving that its ownership of the
water system was a “more necessary public use.”20
V. JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT
Justice McKinnon authored a separate dissent that emphasized the
majority’s error in applying the “more necessary” requirement. She also
joined Justice Rice’s dissent regarding the discovery violations.21
According to Justice McKinnon, the majority departed from precedent and
erroneously applied the “more necessary public use” requirement.22
According to Justice McKinnon, § 70–30–111(1)(c) and precedent require
that the proposed public use be different from the current public use.23
When the uses are identical, property cannot be taken for the same public
use without express or implied legislative authorization.24 Justice
McKinnon characterized the majority’s use of the “more necessary”
requirement as both legally incorrect and overstepping the role of the
judiciary by rule-making in an arena where policy makers are making
important decisions about the necessity and desirability of public
ownership.25
VI. ANALYSIS
The majority and Justice McKinnon’s application and
interpretation of the “more necessary public use” requirement stand in
sharp contrast. Justice McKinnon asserts that the analysis should not be
applied when the proposed use is the same as the current use. The majority
holds that the proposed use can be the same as the current use,
emphasizing that municipal ownership destroys the for-profit use of the
water system. Based on precedent and the correct interpretation of the
statutes, the majority properly applied and analyzed the “more necessary
public use” requirement. Further, although the discovery tactics used by
the City were troubling, the majority properly found that the City’s actions
did not result in a deprival of Mountain Water’s due process.

Id. at *30–31; Appellant Mountain Water Co.’s Opening Brief, City of Missoula v. Mountain Water,
2015 WL 6407430 at *17–18 (Mont. Aug. 2, 2016).
20
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *30–31; MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–111.
21
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *41–42 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
22
Id. at *35.
23
Id. at *35, 39.
24
Id. at *36.
25
Id. at *40.
19
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A. Eminent Domain in Montana
Eminent domain refers to a government’s inherent power to take
private property for public use.26 The Montana legislature recognized
certain public uses subject to the government’s power to exercise eminent
domain, which includes “water and water supply systems.”27
Condemnation proceedings are split into two procedural phases by statute:
the necessity phase and the valuation phase.28 Condemnation proceedings
commence with a necessity phase, and depending on the outcome of the
necessity phase, conclude in a valuation phase.29 The first phase is based
on a district court’s factual findings that determine whether the “public
interest requires the taking.”30
Before a property can be condemned, a condemnor must show by
a “preponderance of the evidence that the public interest requires the
taking based on the following findings . . . if already being used for a public
use, that the public use for which the property is proposed to be used is a
more necessary public use.”31 The “more necessary public use”
requirement of § 70–30–111(1)(c) can be seen as an exception to the prior
public use doctrine.32 According to the prior public use doctrine, if a
property is already dedicated to a public use, then an entity cannot exercise
its power of eminent domain over the property for a different public use
unless the legislature has specifically authorized it.33 Both the language of
§ 70–30–111(1)(c) and the prior public use doctrine presume a conflict or
incompatibility of public uses.34 That is, the “more necessary public use”
analysis will only be employed “when we have two public uses that are
not compatible uses.”35
Court precedent seemingly requires an initial inquiry before
applying the “more necessary public use” analysis. In Montana Talc Co.
v. Cyprus Mines Corp.,36 the Court found that if the proposed public use
26

26 AM.JUR.2D. Eminent Domain § 2 (WestlawNext through Sept. 2016); see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70–30–101 (2015).
27
McTaggart v. Mont. Power Co., 602 P.2d 992, 995 (Mont. 1979); M ONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–
102(6).
28
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–206; Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *3.
29
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70–30–206 to 207.
30
Id. at § 70–30–111.
31
Id. (emphasis added).
32
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *36 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
33
26 AM.JUR.2D. Eminent Domain, supra note 26, § 103; see Cocanougher v. Zieigler, 112 P.2d 1058,
1061 (Mont. 1941) (explaining that property already dedicated to a public use cannot be condemned
for a different public use without clear or implied legislative intent).
34
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–111 (“if already being used for a public use, that the public use for
which the property is proposed to be used is a more necessary public use”); 26 AM. JUR. 2D. Eminent
Domain, supra note 26, § 103 (“Ordinarily, land devoted to one public use cannot be taken for another
inconsistent public use unless . . . .”) (emphasis added).
35
Mont. Power Co. v. Burlington N. Ry. Co., 900 P.2d 888, 894 (Mont. 1995) (citing Mont. Talc Co.
v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 748 P.2d 444, 451–52 (Mont. 1987); Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1061; Butte,
Anaconda & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mont. Union Ry. Co., 41 P. 232, 244 (Mont. 1895).
36
748 P.2d at 452.
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affects the owner’s rights “such that his use will be defeated or seriously
interfered with . . . the statute requiring a ‘more necessary’ public use
comes into play.” Similarly in Cocanougher v. Zeigler,37 the Court
determined that the “more necessary public use” analysis is used when
“the latter use is such as will destroy the prior use.” In Butte, Anaconda &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Montana Railway Union Co.,38 the Court concluded
“[w]e cannot agree that the statute which authorizes lands to be
appropriated for a more necessary public use means a different public use
in all cases. If the legislature had intended that construction . . . they could
easily have said a different public use.”
These Montana cases help produce a framework for determining
whether uses are compatible, and thus whether to engage a “more
necessary public use” analysis. The relevant analysis could be phrased: (1)
are the proposed uses incompatible (using guidance from Montana Talc,
Cocanougher, and Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co. to determine
whether uses are compatible); and if so (2) is municipal ownership of a
water system a more necessary public use than private ownership of a
water system?
B. Application of the More Necessary Public Use Analysis
The proposed public use of municipal ownership of the water
system is incompatible with the former public use as a privately owned
water system simply because the City’s ownership would destroy
Mountain Water’s “right to the use of the [water system].”39 Or put another
way, the City’s condemnation of the water system would result in
Mountain Water’s being “completely deprived of [its] public use of
appropriated property, such that [its] use will be defeated or seriously
interfered with by the proposed condemnor’s right if granted.”40
Although Justice McKinnon devotes much of her opinion to assert
that the majority misapplied the “more necessary public use” analysis, the
majority only briefly addresses Justice McKinnon’s argument and its
application of the “more necessary public use” analysis: “the City’s
acquisition of the water system would ‘inhibit’ Mountain Water’s use of
its property by wholly depriving it of the use of the water system, the uses
are not compatible, thus requiring the ‘more necessary’ analysis to be
conducted.”41
According to Justice McKinnon, the “more necessary use”
requirement assumes that the use is incompatible with the current public
use and that the use that forms the basis for the condemnation must be a
37

Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1060.
41 P. at 246–247 (emphasis added).
39
Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1060.
40
Montana Talc, 748 P.2d at 452.
41
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *21.
38
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different use.42 Without the requirement of a different use, the “more
necessary” analysis “is necessarily reduced therefore to the virtues of
private and public ownership.”43 Although Justice McKinnon is correct
that the two uses must be incompatible for the Court to employ a “more
necessary” analysis, she incorrectly interprets the statute and precedent to
require that “incompatible” equal “different.”
The majority properly interpreted and applied the “more necessary
public use” analysis. The Court in Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co.
explicitly rejected the requirement that the uses must be different.44
Further, both Coconaugher and Montana Talc use language indicating that
when one use will “destroy” or “completely deprive” the prior owner’s
use, then they are incompatible and the “more necessary” test is
employed.45 A municipality’s proposed public use can be incompatible
with a private company’s ownership of the water system, despite being
dedicated to the same use, simply because the municipality’s ownership
of the water system is incompatible with Mountain Water’s ownership of
the water system.
C. Factual Findings in Support of the More Necessary Public Use
“‘Necessary,’ in the context of eminent domain, does not mean
absolute or indispensable, but reasonable, requisite and proper for the
accomplishment of the intended objective.”46 This standard is flexible and
dependent on the circumstances of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.47 In determining whether a proposed public use is a “more
necessary public use,” the Court looked at a broad range of factors,
including:
The owner’s profit motive, the consequences of out-ofstate ownership, the effect on public savings, rates, and
charges, the effect of having the home office in the
municipality, the public interest as expressed by city
residents, the effect on the water system’s current
employees, and ‘the importance of the City obtaining
ownership of the water rights themselves, in order that the
City may assure its inhabitants of long range access to
water.’48
42

Id. at *35.
Id. at *38.
Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co., 41 P. at 246–47.
45
Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1060; Montana Talc, 748 P.2d at 452.
46
Park County v. Adams, 100 P.3d 640, 643 (Mont. 2004) (defining “necessary” under 70–30–111(b)
“the taking is necessary to the use.” The Court in Mountain Water transfers the definition of
“necessary” under subsection (b) and applies it to subsection (c) “a more necessary public use.”).
47
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *21.
48
Id. (quoting Mountain Water I, 743 P.2d at 595–96).
43
44
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Justices Rice and McKinnon agreed with Mountain Water that the
district court’s findings were based on a general preference for municipal
ownership and not the specific factual findings that § 70–30–111(1)(c)
requires.49 Defendants asserted that the factual findings were insufficient
for the district court to find that the City’s acquisition was a more
necessary public use. According to Mountain Water, the district court’s
refusal to allow additional evidence of Mountain Water’s valuation in
during the condemnation phase prevented the district court from truly
assessing the financial circumstances and the impact on the savings, rates,
and charges.50 The district court, in interpreting the statutory requirements
of condemnation proceedings, held that allowing evidence of valuation in
during the necessity phase would infringe on decisions left to the jury and
the commissioners.51 The Court noted counsel’s assertion during oral
argument that Mountain Water was no longer seeking a remand for a new
trial, but rather, was seeking outright dismissal of the case.52
The Court evaluated the district court’s exclusion of valuation
evidence to determine if it was severe enough to require dismissal of the
case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to admit evidence of the valuation.53 It is hard to predict whether or not
counsel’s assertion was the death knell of this issue on appeal, but it seems
that the Court would have remained unpersuaded given that some evidence
of valuation was admitted, including evidence of rate increases in the event
of a higher-than-expected acquisition price.54 Additionally, the ruling on
the admissibility of further evidence of valuation is within the district
court’s discretionary power to admit evidence.55
Due to the fact-intensive nature of the lower court proceeding, a
clearly erroneous standard was applied to much of the district court’s
Preliminary Order of Condemnation.56 A clearly erroneous standard is the
appropriate standard to apply to factual findings in support of a “more
necessary public use” conclusion. Section 70–30–111 itself is titled “Facts
Necessary to be Found Before Condemnation.”57 Precedent establishes
that determining whether a proposed public use is a “more necessary

Appellant Mountain Water Co.’s Opening Brief, supra note 19, at *17–18; Mountain Water, 2016
WL 4124135, at *28, 40 (Rice, J., dissenting; McKinnon, J., dissenting).
50
Appellant Mountain Water Co.’s Opening Brief, supra note 19, at *21–23.
51
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *7.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at *8.
55
See Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P.3d 561, 582 (Mont. 2007) (“When reviewing a district court’s
evidentiary rulings we do not determine whether this Court would have made the same ruling. Rather,
we determine whether the district court abused its discretion.”) (internal citations omitted).
56
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *3 (“We review a district court’s findings of fact to
determine if they are clearly erroneous.”).
57
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–111.
49
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public use” is a “fact-specific, judicial determination.”58 Under this
standard, a district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless “the
trial court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or a review of
the record ‘leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’”59 However, when a lower court applies
factual findings to the appropriate legal framework, the Court employs a
de novo review.60
The Court exhaustively discussed the lower court’s 63 pages of
factual findings.61 The Court found evidence to support the district court’s
findings that the public supported the condemnation and that municipal
ownership would promote long-term stability, efficiency, and
infrastructure improvements.62 Additionally, the Court reviewed the City’s
evidence about its ability to manage the water system and the financial
considerations “including administrative expenses, profit motive, rate
setting, and the cost of acquisition and needed capital improvements.”63
The evidence at trial regarding the financial considerations came from
experts, city employees, and testimony about the ability of the City to
access state and federal grants that would not be available to a private
owner.64 The district court also weighed public and economic policy
factors, which included testimony from experts on the generalities of
municipal ownership of water utilities.65 The district court also reviewed
evidence regarding the effect on the public health, safety and welfare.66
Finally, the district court assessed the impact of condemnation on
Mountain Waters employees.67
While it is true that the district court used broad-brush language
in some of its factual findings, there was not a lack of specificity sufficient
to overturn its factual findings, particularly when noting the broad
deference inherent in a clearly erroneous standard. Based on the extensive
factual findings made by the district court, the majority was bound to
uphold them in light of the highly deferential standard imposed in
reviewing findings of fact. Since the Court did not find error with the
district court’s detailed factual findings, the Court similarly found no error
in the court’s conclusion that the City’s acquisition of the water system

58

Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *9 (citing Mountain Water I, 743 P.2d at 594; Helena v.
Rogan, 68 P. 798, 802 (Mont. 1902); Butte, Anaconda & Pac. Ry., 41 P. at 243).
59
Id. at *10 (quoting Mont. Power Co., 900 P.2d at 890).
60
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Cringle, 281 P.3d 203, 206 (Mont. 2012) (reviewing de novo “the district court’s
application of controlling legal principles to its factual findings”).
61
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *22.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 23.
64
Id. at 24.
65
Id. at 25.
66
Id. at 26.
67
Id.
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constituted a more necessary use than its current use as a private, for-profit
utility.68
D. Constitutional Due Process Concerns
At its core, eminent domain is concerned with balancing
fundamental interests: the public’s interest and private property owners’
procedural due process rights. Threaded through the eminent domain
statutes are phrases that point to this tension: “just compensation”; “public
use”; “more necessary”; and the various constitutional, notice, and
procedural requirements of the laws governing eminent domain.
The Montana Constitution designates the right to possess and
protect property as an inalienable right.69 Because of Montana’s
constitutional protection for property ownership, the power of eminent
domain “must be strictly construed.”70 Additionally, the eminent domain
statutes “must be given its plain interpretation, favoring the person’s
fundamental rights.”71 Due to the nature of eminent domain proceedings,
§ 70–30–206 instructs a district court to “give the proceedings expeditious
and priority consideration.”72 The same statute likewise instructs the
parties to proceed “as expeditiously as possible . . . through all aspects . .
. including discovery and trial.”73 Ensuring that Mountain Water’s due
process rights were not violated necessitates that Mountain Water “receive
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before Missoula
deprive[s] it of its property.”74 Further, due process encompasses “the
ability to discover information relevant to the case against the defendants
along with the identity of the witnesses who are expected to testify and the
substance of the expected testimony.”75
Mountain Water’s due process claim focused on the City’s
discovery tactics that resulted in Mountain Water’s perceived
unpreparedness for trial and unfair prejudice. According to Justice Rice,
the City engaged in deliberately harmful discovery tactics that deprived
Mountain Water of its due process.76 The majority disagreed, maintaining
that Mountain Water conducted discovery effectively and were aware of
who was to testify and the expected substance of testimony.77 The majority
noted that Mountain Water “ha[d] demonstrated inconvenience and
68

Id. at *27.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
70
City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 869 P.2d 790, 792 (Mont. 1994) (citing State v. Aitchison, 30 P.2d
805 (Mont. 1934)).
71
Id.
72
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–206.
73
Id.
74
Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *29 (Rice, J., dissenting).
75
Id. at *5 (majority).
76
Id. at *32 (Rice, J., dissenting).
77
Id. at *5 (majority) (the Court denied Mountain Water’s writ of supervisory control, indicating that
if prejudice resulted the issue could be raised on appeal).
69
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frustration” but concluded Mountain Water had not proved that the district
court abused its discretion or that Mountain Water suffered actual
prejudice.78 The majority also noted that Mountain Water had prepared an
effective and full defense.79
The majority may have been overly dismissive in concluding that
Mountain Water’s due process rights were not violated, and it could be
argued that the holding was influenced by the fact that the case involved
prolonged and complex litigation between sophisticated parties. The
majority noted Mountain Water’s presentation of a full and competent
defense. However, Mountain Water’s argument and Justice Rice’s dissent
detail the City’s discovery tactics and persuasively assert that the City
deliberately abused the discovery process. Even so, given the district
court’s discretion to control the discovery process and the nature of the
litigation, Mountain Water did not provide enough evidence to support a
conclusion that the trial was unfair or that Mountain Water did not receive
sufficient notice and hearing. Due process is a tantamount concern in
eminent domain proceedings, but the district court is given wide latitude
in controlling the discovery process, and the parties are under specific
instructions to proceed expeditiously in light of the unique circumstances
that surround a condemnation proceeding (uncertainty to employees,
ownership, importance to public etc.).
E. The Future of Eminent Domain in Montana
Both dissenters point out the need for legislative action on this
issue. Justice Rice’s directive is express, evidenced in a section of his
dissent titled “A Word for the Legislature” In this section, Justice Rice
encourages the legislature to revisit the statute to clarify the “more
necessary public use” requirement.80 Justice McKinnon also would defer
to the legislature. She identifies municipal ownership of utilities as an
important public policy concern, best suited to resolution via the
legislative process, not judicial intervention.81 However, Missoula’s water
system was the only water system in Montana not owned by a
municipality; therefore, we may not have the chance to see a municipality
exercise its power of eminent domain over a water supply system again.82
VII. CONCLUSION
When a municipality attempts to exercise its power of eminent
domain to condemn a water system already dedicated to public use, a court
78

Id. at *6.
Id.
80
Id. at *34–35 (Rice, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at *40–41 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at *1 (majority opinion).
79
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should employ the “more necessary public use” analysis even when the
proposed public use and the prior public use are the same. The majority
properly applied the “more necessary public use” analysis and, given the
broad deference inherent in review of factual findings, properly affirmed
the district court’s Preliminary Order of Condemnation. Although
Mountain Water helped to establish some framework for assessing
competing public uses, the Court relied on the inherent flexibility in the
deferential standard of review and circumstantial and factual nature of the
determination of a “more necessary public use.” Trial courts should
engage in very clear fact-finding. But because of the deference enjoyed by
trial courts in fact finding, it seems likely that district court decisions will
remain undisturbed without legislative intervention and guidance on the
application of the “more necessary public use” analysis.

